The Utility of Truth: Defining Epistemic Values

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Sections

• Informal Uses of the Distinction
• Sociological Approaches
• Analytical Approaches
• Applying Decision Theory
• The Utility Analysis
• Hesse's Rival Analysis
• What does the distinction apply to?
• Connection to Other Folk Psychology Concepts

Summary

• Epistemic values and value biases can be defined structurally, in terms of the values attaching to the (epistemically possible) consequences of actions.

   

• In the very simplest case, the epistemic motivation is simply the value of true assertion. "Simplest case" here implies a choice between a finite number of hypotheses whose truth is act-independent and where there are no considerations of verisimilitude.

   

• Not every value has to be either an epistemic value or a bias. Specifically, desire for a proposition to be true (or to be false) counts as neither since, assuming act-independence, it has no direct effect on the choice of opinion.

   

• In the determination of opinion, strong value bias overrides strong belief rather than vice versa.

   

• Opinions can be epistemic at the level of a single reasoning individual, but value-biased when we consider the social context. Alternatively, a individual who is unbiased might accept the testimony of people whose opinions are value biased.